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Abstract—Consider a geographical network with associated 
link costs. In anycast routing, network nodes are partitioned 
into two sets – the source nodes and the anycast (destination) 
nodes – and the traffic of each source node is routed towards 
the anycast node providing the minimum routing cost path. By 
considering a given geographical distance parameter D, we 
define an anycast routing solution as D-geodiverse when for 
each source node there are two routing paths, each one 
towards a different anycast node, such that the geographical 
distance between the two paths is at least D. Such a solution 
has the property that any disaster with a coverage diameter 
below D affecting one routing path (but without involving 
neither the source node nor its entire set of outgoing links) 
cannot affect the other path, enhancing in this way the network 
robustness to natural disasters. The selection of the anycast 
nodes has an impact both on the feasibility and cost of a D-
geodiverse anycast routing solution. Therefore, for a desired 
number of anycast nodes R, we define the minimum cost D-
geodiverse anycast problem (MCD-GAP) aiming to identify a 
set of R anycast nodes that obtain a minimum cost routing 
solution. The problem is defined based on integer linear 
programming and is extended to consider the existence of 
vulnerability regions in the network, i.e., by imposing the 
geographical distance D only between network elements 
belonging to the same region. We present computational 
results showing the tradeoff between D and R in the optimal 
solutions obtained with and without vulnerability regions.  
Keywords—minimum cost routing, anycast routing, path 
geodiversity, integer linear programming  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Due to the rising risk of natural disasters (hurricanes, 
floods, earthquakes), disaster based failures are frequently 
disrupting telecommunication networks [1]. When a disaster 
occurs, the typical assumption is that all network elements 
covered by the disaster are shut down. It is then important to 
minimize the disaster impact outside the disaster area (the 
pre-disaster problem) and network planning and management 
tools, as in [2], are important for mitigating the impact of 
disasters, and more generally of spatially correlated failures 
[3]. The network preparedness to natural disasters can be 
improved through path geodiversity [4], i.e., to take into 
consideration the geographical diversity of the network 
topology when making routing decisions. In [5–6], a routing 
protocol is proposed able to provide multiple geographically 
diverse paths to end nodes. In [7–8], a path geodiversity 
strategy is exploited assuming that a pair of routing paths is 
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defined for each pair of nodes, where the two paths are 
geographically separated by a minimum distance D. The 
separation is defined as the minimum distance between 
intermediate nodes of one path and of the other path [7] or 
between intermediate elements (nodes and links) of one path 
and all elements of the other path [8]. The aim is that a 
disaster with a geographical coverage lower than D affecting 
intermediate elements of one path does not affect the other 
path. In [9–10], two close problems are addressed both 
considering a generalization of the min-cut and max-flow 
problems under geographic failures which are modelled as 
circular disks. Path geodiversity has also been exploited 
recently in the context of optical core networks [11–13]. 
These works, though, consider geodiversity routing for 
unicast communications. On the other hand, anycast routing 
is becoming increasingly important. Two major examples are 
Content Delivery Networking (CDN) and Software Defined 
Networking (SDN). In CDN, content is replicated over 
multiple data centers (DCs) and users retrieve content from 
the closest DC hosting it. The placement of content replicas 
on a supporting network is known as the Replica Placement 
Problem (RPP). In SDN, the network control plane is 
separated from the data plane and is based on a set of 
physically distributed SDN controllers. Then, in a logically 
centralized control plane, switches query the closest 
(primary) controller for routing decisions. The placement of 
controllers over the data plane network is known as the 
Controller Placement Problem (CPP).  
Both CDN and SDN robustness against failures has been 
recently addressed. In [14], integer linear programming (ILP) 
and heuristic methods are proposed for the combined RPP 
and routing assignment in optical networks, where disasters 
are modeled as Shared Risk Groups (SRGs). In [15], a 
probability disaster model is assumed and a disaster-aware 
dynamic content-management algorithm is proposed to 
dynamically adapt the replica placement according to 
disaster probability updates so that the expected content loss 
is reduced at any time (see [16] for a more detailed survey). 
In [17–19], the CDN robustness to link cut attacks is studied 
which includes appropriate vulnerability measures [17–18] 
and a method to determine RPP Pareto-optimal solutions 
between user-to-replica distance and attack robustness [18]. 
Different works have also addressed resilient CPP variants in 
the context of SDN. In [20], controllers are assumed to fail 
with a given probability and the average delays take into 
account failure probabilities. In [21], a CPP is proposed 
guaranteeing two node disjoint paths from each switch to its 
primary controller, and another CPP guaranteeing node 
disjoint paths from each switch to its primary and to its 
backup controller. In [22], the resilient capacitated CPP is 
addressed considering multiple controller failures where each 
switch has a given traffic load and controllers have an 
associated capacity. Assuming that an attacker knows the 
data plane topology but is unaware of the controller 
locations, the network vulnerabilities to centrality-based 
attacks are studied in [23] and the controller locations are 
proposed to be the nodes least chosen by the different 
attacks. In [24], CPP solutions are based on a failure 
correlation assessment of nodes (and links) and different 
types of minimal cut sets (composed of nodes and/or links) 
are considered to assess the network unavailability. 
Optimization methods are proposed in [25–26] to compute 
the most robust CPP solutions to malicious node attacks.  
None of these works exploit geodiversity routing as a 
means to enhance the network preparedness to natural 
disasters. The closest work is [14] which studies the content 
placement, routing, and protection of paths on a datacenter 
over optical network scenario but SRGs modeling disasters 
must be known a priori. In SDN, [21] exploits the idea of 
having two node disjoint paths from each switch (one to its 
primary and another to its backup controller) to protect the 
SDN control plane to single node failures and geodiversity 
routing is a natural extension of such work. To the best of 
our knowledge, the selection of the anycast nodes exploiting 
the path geodiversity concept has not been addressed. 
Consider a given network with associated link costs. In 
anycast routing, network nodes are partitioned into two sets – 
the source nodes and the anycast nodes – and the traffic of 
each source node is routed towards the anycast node 
providing the minimum routing cost path. For a given 
geographical distance D, we define an anycast routing 
solution as being D-geodiverse when for each source node 
there are two routing paths, each one towards a different 
anycast node, such that the geographical distance between 
the two paths is at least D. Similar to the unicast case, this 
solution has the property that any disaster with a coverage 
diameter below D affecting one routing path (but without 
involving neither the source node nor its entire set of 
outgoing links) cannot affect the other path. Then, for a 
desired number of anycast nodes R, we define the minimum 
cost D-geodiverse anycast problem (MCD-GAP) aiming to 
identify a set of R anycast nodes that obtain a minimum cost 
routing solution. MCD-GAP is defined based on integer 
linear programming and is extended to consider the existence 
of vulnerability regions in the network, i.e., by imposing the 
minimum geographical distance D only between network 
elements belonging to the same region. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the 
concept of a pair of ܦ -geodiverse paths in the anycast 
context. Section III describes the MCD-GAP through integer 
linear programming both with and without vulnerability 
regions. Section IV presents the computational results and 
analyses the tradeoff between the geographical distance D 
and the number of anycast nodes R in the optimal solutions. 
Finally, Section V presents the main conclusions of the work. 
II. PAIR OF ܦ-GEODIVERSE ANYCAST PATHS 
For a given set of anycast nodes on a given geographical 
network, a pair of D-geodiverse anycast paths starting at a 
given source node is a pair of node disjoint routing paths, 
each one towards a different anycast node, and whose 
minimum distance is at least D. Consider the example of Fig. 
1 with 8 nodes (1 to 8) and 11 links (a to k) whose 
geographical routes are represented as graph edges. In this 
example, consider the source node 1 and the anycast nodes 3, 
5 and 8 (highlighted in gray). 
 
Fig. 1. Geographical network example. 
Fig. 2 presents 3 pairs of anycast paths (thick links) with 
the minimum distance between each pair highlighted in red. 
In Fig. 2a, the minimum distance ܦଵ is the minimum distance 
between node 5 and link b. In this case, any disaster with a 
geographical coverage below ܦଵ can only affect both paths if 
it covers either the source node 1 or simultaneously links a 
and e. Otherwise, source node 1 will always be able to 
communicate with an anycast node. In Fig. 2b, the minimum 
distance ܦଶ is the distance between nodes 5 and 8 and in Fig. 
2c, the minimum distance ܦଷ  is the minimum distance 
between node 4 and link a. Assuming ܦଵ < ܦଶ < ܦଷ, if the 
required D is lower than ܦଵ, all solutions are feasible and the 
best solution is the one whose total link cost in both paths is 
minimal. Otherwise, the feasible solutions are the ones 
whose minimum distance is not lower than D. If ܦ > ܦଷ , 
none of the solutions is feasible for these anycast nodes. In 
this case, either a different set of anycast nodes can enable 
the existence of a pair of D-geodiverse anycast paths for 
node 1 or a feasible solution is always to consider node 1 as 
an anycast node. 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
(c) 
Fig. 2. Three pairs of anycast paths for source node 1. 
The geographical distance between two links ܽ  and ܾ , 
denoted by ߜ(ܽ, ܾ), is the minimum distance between any 
point of one link and any point of the other link. Since the 
geographical distance between two links ܽ and ܾ is always 
lower or equal to the geographical distance between any end 
node of ܽ and any end node of ܾ, to guarantee the minimum 
distance D between two routing paths, we only need to 
consider the distances between links. 
Nevertheless, special care is required for the links 
incident to the source node.  In a pair of routing paths, one of 
these links must belong to one path and another of these links 
must belong to the other path and, by the previous definition, 
the distance between these links is 0 (they share the source 
node). In this case, we define their distance based on their 
non-common end nodes. Consider two links a and b sharing 
source node ݏ  whose end nodes are (ݏ, ݅)  and (ݏ, ݆) , 
respectively. Consider ߛ௔ = ߜ(ݏ, ݅)  and ߛ௕ = ߜ(ݏ, ݆)  as the 
distance between the end nodes of links a and b, 
respectively. The distance ߚ௔௕  from ܽ  to ܾ  is defined as ߚ௔௕ = ߜ(݅, ܾ)  if ߜ(݅, ܾ) < ߛ௔ , or ߚ௔௕ = +∞  otherwise. 
Similarly, the distance ߚ௕௔  from ܾ to ܽ is defined as ߚ௕௔ =ߜ(݆, ܽ)  if ߜ(݆, ܽ) < ߛ௕ , or ߚ௕௔ = +∞  otherwise. Then, the 
geographical distance ߜ(ܽ, ܾ)  is defined as ߜ(ܽ, ܾ) =
min(ߚ௔௕, ߚ௕௔). 
Fig. 3a shows one example of a source node s connected 
to three neighbor nodes: node 1 through link ܽ , node 2 
through link ܾ and node 3 through link ܿ. Consider first the 
pair of links ܽ and ܾ. In Fig. 3b, the minimum distance ߚ௔௕  
from node 1 (the non-common end node of link a) to link b 
is shorter than the distance ߛ௔ from node 1 to the source node 
s. On the other hand, the minimum distance from node 2 to 
link a is ߛ௕ . So, ߜ(ܽ, ܾ) = min(ߚ௔௕, +∞) = ߚ௔௕ . In the 
other two link pairs ( ܽ  and ܿ , ܾ  and ܿ ), the minimum 
distance between the non-common end node of one link and 
the other link is always its distance to the source node and, 
so, ߜ(ܽ, ܿ) = ߜ(ܾ, ܿ) = +∞ . In practice, considering these 
distances infinite is equivalent to ignoring their distance. The 
reason is that if both links are in the two routing paths, the 
minimum coverage disaster that shuts down the non-
common end node of one link and the other link also shuts 
down the source node and such a disaster cannot be protected 
(recall that a disaster involving the source node cannot be 
protected by any pair of anycast paths). 
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Fig. 3. Geographical distance betweek links incident to the source node s. 
Consider a geographical network with a set of nodes N 
and a set of links L. Since the geographical distances, as 
defined before, depend on the source node ݏ ∈ ܰ, we define 
set ௦ܲ for a given minimum distance D and for each node ݏ ∈ܰ composed by the pairs of links p and q such that ߜ(݌, ݍ) <
ܦ , i.e., ௦ܲ  is the set of link pairs that cannot belong 
simultaneously to both routing paths (one in each path). The 
different sets ௦ܲ  differ between them only on the pairs of 
links sharing the source node s. These sets will be used in 
next section to define the appropriate geodiversity 
constraints. Note that, by default, each set ௦ܲ  includes all 
pairs of links with a common end node when this node is not 
the source node s (their geographical distance is 0, which is 
always below D). For reasons that will be clear in the next 
section, we exclude these link pairs from each set ௦ܲ. 
III. MINIMUM COST ܦ-GEODIVERSE ANYCAST PROBLEM  
Consider the set of nodes N and the set of links L of a 
geographical network. Each link ݌ ∈ ܮ connecting two nodes 
is modelled by two opposite arcs (݌ଵ, ݌ଶ) and (݌ଶ, ݌ଵ) where ݌ଵ  and ݌ଶ  are the link end nodes. Consider the network 
modelled by a directed graph ܩ = (ܰ, ܣ) where ܣ is set of 
all arcs of the network and ܿ௜௝  is the cost of using arc (݅, ݆) ∈
ܣ	  on each routing path. Arc costs can have different 
meanings but in most CDN and SDN works represent delays 
so that the routing cost minimization aims to minimize the 
average routing delay. For a desired geographical distance D 
and number of anycast nodes R, the MCD-GAP aims to 
select ܴ anycast nodes such that for each other node in the 
network there is a pair of D-geodiverse anycast paths and the 
total routing cost is minimized. 
A. MCD-GAP without Vulnerability Regions 
For each node ݏ ∈ ܰ  and the minimum geographical 
distance D, consider the set of link pairs ௦ܲ  as defined in 
Section II. MCD-GAP is formulated as an integer linear 
programming (ILP) model with the following variables: 
ݎ௜ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if node ݅ is selected 
as an anycast node, or 0 otherwise
ܽ௜௦ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if node ݅ is the 
destination node of the first path of source 
node ݏ, or 0 otherwise 
ܾ௜௦ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if node ݅ is the 
destination node of the second path of 
source node ݏ, or 0 otherwise 
ݔ௜௝௦ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if arc (݅, ݆) belongs to the first path of source node ݏ , or 0 
otherwise
ݕ௜௝௦ ∈ {0,1} binary variable that is 1 if arc (݅, ݆) belongs 
to the second path of source node ݏ, or 0 
otherwise
Consider ܸ(݅) as the set of all neighboring nodes of ݅ , 
i.e., all nodes that are connected to ݅ by an arc in ܣ. Also 
consider the binary parameters ݐ௜௦, for all ݏ, ݅ ∈ ܰ, which are 
equal to 1 when ݅ = ݏ and equal to 0 when ݅ ≠ ݏ. An ILP 
model defining MCD-GAP is given by: 
Min ∑ ∑ ܿ௜௝(ݔ௜௝௦ + ݕ௜௝௦ )(௜,௝)∈஺	௦∈ே  (1) 
Subject to: 
∑ ݎ௜௜∈ே = ܴ   (2) 
∑ (ݔ௝௜௦ − ݔ௜௝௦ )௝∈௏(௜) = ܽ௜௦ − ݐ௜௦  ݏ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ (3) 
∑ (ݕ௝௜௦ − ݕ௜௝௦ )௝∈௏(௜) = ܾ௜௦ − ݐ௜௦  ݏ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ (4) 
∑ ൫ݔ௝௜௦ + ݕ௝௜௦ ൯ ≤ 1௝∈௏(௜)   ݏ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ\{ݏ} (5) 
ܽ௜௦ + ܾ௜௦ ≤ ݎ௜	 ݏ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ\{ݏ} (6) 
ܽ௦௦ + ܾ௦௦ = 2ݎ௦  ݏ ∈ ܰ (7) 
∑ (ܽ௜௦ + ܾ௜௦)௜∈ே = 2  ݏ ∈ ܰ (8) 
ݔ௣భ௣మ௦ + ݔ௣మ௣భ௦ + ݕ௤భ௤మ௦ + ݕ௤మ௤భ௦ ≤ 1   
   ݏ ∈ ܰ, (݌, ݍ) ∈ ௦ܲ (9) 
ݔ௤భ௤మ௦ + ݔ௤మ௤భ௦ + ݕ௣భ௣మ௦ + ݕ௣మ௣భ௦ ≤ 1   
   ݏ ∈ ܰ, (݌, ݍ) ∈ ௦ܲ (10) 
ݔ௜௝௦ , ݕ௜௝௦ ∈ {0,1}  ݏ ∈ ܰ, (݅, ݆) ∈ ܣ (11) 
ܽ௜௦, ܾ௜௦ ∈ {0,1}  ݏ ∈ ܰ, ݅ ∈ ܰ (12) 
ݎ௜ ∈ {0,1} ݅ ∈ ܰ (13) 
The objective function (1) is the minimization of the total 
cost of all pairs of routing paths. Constraints (2) guarantee 
that a total of ܴ nodes are selected as anycast nodes. 
Constraints (3–4) are the path conservation constraints 
for the two routing paths of each source node ݏ ∈ ܰ . 
Constraints (3) guarantee that variables ݔ௜௝௦  define the first 
routing path from node s to the destination node i (i.e., the 
node i such that ܽ௜௦ = 1). Constraints (4) are the equivalent to 
constraints (3) for the second routing path from node s to the 
node i such that ܾ௜௦ = 1. If both destination nodes are the 
source node s (i.e., when ܽ௦௦ = 1 and ܾ௦௦ = 1) constraints (3) 
let variables ݔ௜௝௦  be set to 0 and constraints (4) let variables 
ݕ௜௝௦  be set to 0, which means that constraints (3–4) let both 
routing paths be empty. Constraints (5) guarantee that the 
two routing paths cannot share any node besides the source 
node s (i.e., the two routing paths are node disjoint). 
Constraints (6–8) guarantee a proper selection of 
destination nodes for all pairs of routing paths. Constraints 
(6) guarantee that all destination nodes are anycast nodes. If 
the source node s is an anycast node, constraints (7) 
guarantee that it is also the destination node of its two 
routing paths (recall that in this case, constraints (3–4) allow 
the routing paths to be empty). Otherwise, constraints (8), 
together with constraints (6), guarantee that the destination 
nodes are two different anycast nodes for each source node s. 
Constraints (9–10) are the geodiversity constraints, i.e., 
they guarantee that all pairs of routing paths are D-
geodiverse. For each node ݏ ∈ ܰ  and each pair of links 
(݌, ݍ) ∈ ௦ܲ , if one of the arcs of link p is in the first path 
(constraints (9)) or in the second path (constraints (10)), none 
of the arcs of link q can be in the second path nor in the first 
path, respectively. Otherwise, if one of the arcs of link q is in 
the first path (constraints (10)) or in the second path 
(constraints (9)), none of the arcs of link p can be in the 
second path nor on the first path, respectively. Finally, 
constraints (11–13) are variable domain constraints. 
Depending on value D, the number of link pairs of sets ௦ܲ 
(and, consequently, the number of constraints (9–10)) can be 
too large. The node disjoint constraints (5) are a compact set 
of constraints guaranteeing that the pairs of links sharing a 
common end node cannot be simultaneously in the pair of 
routing paths. Therefore, such link pairs do not need to be 
included in sets ௦ܲ (as described at the end of Section II). Our 
computational tests showed that this approach not only 
reduces the solution runtime of many problem instances but 
also reduces the number of instances that cannot be solved to 
optimality due to out-of-memory issues. 
Nevertheless, this ILP model has the symmetry problem 
that makes it hard to be solved for all our instances of 
interest. This problem is due to the fact that each pair of 
routing paths is represented by two mathematical solutions, 
one solution where variables ݔ௜௝௦  and ݕ௜௝௦  represent the paths 
in one order and another where the same variables represent 
the paths in the reverse order. We mitigated the symmetry 
problem with the following variable elimination rule. For 
each source node ݏ ∈ ܰ , we take the first pair of links 
(݌, ݍ) ∈ ௦ܲ with s as a common end node. If such link pair 
does not exist, we do nothing. If it exists, since both links 
cannot be simultaneously used, we impose (without any lack 
of generality) that they can be used only in the first routing 
path of source node s by setting to 0 the four variables 
(ݕ௣భ௣మ௦ , ݕ௣మ௣భ௦ , ݕ௤భ௤మ௦  and ݕ௤మ௤భ௦ ) associated with the second 
routing path. Our computational tests showed that this 
variable elimination rule further reduces the solution runtime 
of many problem instances and solves the out-of-memory 
issues of almost all of the problem instances.  
B. MCD-GAP with Vulnerability Regions 
MCD-GAP, as defined by the previous ILP model, 
assumes that a disaster can happen at any geographical area 
of the network and, therefore, requires all pairs of anycast 
paths to be geographically separated by at least D in all their 
extension. In practice, the probability of natural hazards is 
not uniform and network operators might want to tailor the 
network robustness to the different hazard types and regions 
of their networks, which are referred as vulnerability regions. 
Moreover, the network operator might consider a different 
minimum geographical separation between each pair of paths 
for each vulnerability region, depending on its hazard type. 
So, consider a set of V vulnerability regions and a minimum 
geographical distance ܦ௩  associated to each region ݒ =1…ܸ . The aim is that each pair of paths must be node 
disjoint outside regions and must be ܦ௩-geodiverse  inside 
each vulnerability region ݒ = 1…ܸ. 
The proposed ILP model can consider vulnerability 
regions by only redefining sets ௦ܲ. We first compute the links 
belonging to each vulnerability region as the ones that are 
incident on nodes belonging to the region and/or intersect the 
region (each link can belong to multiple regions). Then, for 
each node ݏ ∈ ܰ, the set ௦ܲ is composed by all pairs of links (݌, ݍ) that belong to the same region v such that ߜ(݌, ݍ) <
ܦ௩ . If a pair of links belongs to more than one vulnerability 
region, we impose the largest minimum geographical 
distance among all involved regions. 
IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
We have conducted a set of computational tests in order 
to assess the efficiency of branch-and-cut methods to solve 
the MCD-GAP and to analyze the tradeoff between the 
geographical distance D and the number of anycast nodes R 
in the optimal solutions. The ILP model was implemented in 
C++ using CPLEX 12.6 callable libraries running 8 threads. 
All problem instances were solved on a 16 core server with 
64 GB of RAM running Windows OS. In the tests, we have 
used Germany50 network (Fig. 4a) with 50 nodes, 88 links 
and an average node degree of 3.52 (information available at 
sndlib.zib.de) and CORONET CONUS network (Fig. 5a) 
with 75 nodes, 99 links and an average node degree of 2.64 
(information available at monarchna.com/topology.html). In 
both cases, all distances were computed considering that 
links follow the shortest path over the terrestrial surface. 
With these assumptions, the graph diameter (the longest 
shortest path between any two nodes) is 934 km for 
Germany50 and 6472 km for CORONET CONUS. 
 
          (a)     (b) 
Fig. 4. Germany50 without (a) and with (b) vulnerability regions. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 5. CORONET CONUS without (a) and with (b) vulnerability regions. 
For the instances with vulnerability regions, we have 
considered publicly available natural hazard maps for the 
countries harboring the two networks. For Germany50, we 
considered the Germany seismic hazard map [27]. An 
approximation of the two most hazardous regions (level VI-
VIII in [27]) was used to define the two vulnerability regions 
shown in Fig. 4b. For CORONET CONUS, we considered 
the USA natural hazard risk map which jointly considers risk 
maps for earthquakes, floods, tornados and hurricanes 
(available at http://alertsystemsgroup.com/earthquake-early-
warning/informative-maps). Approximations of the most 
hazardous regions were considered to define the three 
vulnerability regions shown in Fig. 5b: the left region is most 
prone to earthquakes, the middle region is most prone to 
tornados and the right region is most prone to hurricanes. 
In the computational tests, we have assumed five 
different values for the geographical distance: D = 20, 40, 60, 
80 and 100 Km for the smallest Germany50 and D = 60, 120, 
180, 240 and 300 Km for the largest CORONET CONUS. 
For comparative analysis, the instances with vulnerability 
regions consider the same value of D in all regions (i.e., 
ܦ௩ = ܦ  for all ݒ = 1…ܸ). For each value of D, we have 
solved the problem instance for all meaningful values of R, 
i.e., for R = 2…|N| – 1. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 6. Optimal costs of Germany50 without (a) and with (b) vulnerability 
regions. In (c), the costs with (labelled with *) and without vulnerability 
regions for D = 40 and 100 Km. 
Fig. 6 presents the optimal cost values of all Germany50 
feasible problem instances without vulnerability regions (Fig. 
6a) and with vulnerability regions (Fig. 6b). For comparison 
reasons, we repeat in Fig. 6c the results with and without 
vulnerability regions for D = 40 and 100 Km (the pairs of 
values D and R not present in these figures are the ones 
whose problem instances are infeasible). The results of Fig. 
6a and 6b show some expected conclusions. Firstly, the 
optimal solution cost increases with larger geographical 
distances D: when requiring more geographically separated 
pairs of anycast paths, they become longer and, therefore, the 
average cost of all pairs of anycast paths becomes higher. 
Secondly, the optimal solution cost decreases with higher 
number of anycast nodes R: with more anycast nodes, there 
are more possible destination nodes nearby each source node 
and, therefore, the average cost of all pairs of anycast paths 
becomes lower. Finally, the minimum number of anycast 
nodes R increases with larger values of D: when requiring 
more geographically separated pairs of anycast paths, more 
nodes must be selected as anycast nodes (recall the 
discussion in Section II with the example of Fig. 2). 
Comparing the results with and without vulnerability 
regions, we reach two key conclusions. Firstly, for the pairs 
of values D and R such that both cases are feasible, there are 
cost gains in considering vulnerability regions. Moreover, 
these cost gains are higher for higher values of D (in Fig. 6c, 
the cost differences is small for D = 40 Km and become very 
large for D = 100 Km). Secondly, the minimum required 
number of anycast nodes R is lower for each value of D 
when vulnerability regions are considered (i.e., we obtain the 
same robustness level to natural disasters with fewer anycast 
nodes). Moreover, this reduction is higher for higher values 
of D (in Fig. 6c, the minimum number of anycast nodes 
reduces from 3 to 2 when D = 40 Km and 18 to 6 when D = 
100 Km). So, the more robust against natural disasters the 
operator aims for its network, the more important it is to 
consider vulnerability regions. A careful characterization of 
the vulnerability regions lets the operator get either more 
robust solutions for the same number of anycast nodes or 
lower number of anycast nodes to reach the same desired 
robustness to natural disasters. 
Concerning the efficiency of CPLEX while solving the 
Germany50 instances, our tests have shown that the 32-bit 
CPLEX version is, on average, more efficient than the 64-bit 
CPLEX version, as long as the required memory does not 
explode. By default, we have solved all instances with the 
32-bit version. Six of all instances ended by out-of-memory: 
the instances without vulnerability regions for D = 100 Km 
and R from 14 to 19. These instances were then solved 
successfully with the 64-bit version. Fig. 7 presents the 
CPLEX runtime values (in seconds) of all Germany50 
instances. The instances without geographical regions are 
separated in: the hardest cases of D = 80 and 100 Km (Fig. 
7a) and the easiest cases of D = 20, 40 and 60 Km (Fig. 7b). 
The instances with geographical regions are presented 
together for all cases (Fig. 7c). 
These results include the runtime values of the infeasible 
problem instances. These results show that, without 
vulnerability regions, the instances become very hard to 
solve for larger values of D. For D up to 60 Km, the worst 
runtime is under 50 seconds (Fig. 7b) and becomes 1030 
seconds for D = 80 Km and almost 20500 seconds (around 5 
hours and 40 minutes) for D = 100 Km (Fig. 7a). On the 
other hand, the instances with vulnerability regions are much 
easier (Fig. 7c) in all cases although, once again, the runtime 
values are higher for larger values of D. 
Fig. 8 presents the optimal cost values of all CORONET 
CONUS feasible problem instances for the cases without 
(Fig. 8a) and with vulnerability regions (Fig. 8b). Once 
again, we repeat in Fig. 8c the results with and without 
vulnerability regions now for D = 120 and 300 Km. These 
results exhibit the same trends but with greater differences 
than the previous Germany50 results.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 7. CPLEX runtime of Germany50 instances without survivability 
regions for D = 80 and 100 Km (a) and for D = 20, 40 and 60 Km (b) and 
with survivability regions (c). 
The results of Fig. 8c show that for the smaller value of 
D = 120 Km, the minimum number of anycast nodes is R = 
14 with a cost of 223008 without vulnerability regions (the 
anycast nodes of the optimal solution shown in Fig. 9a). On 
the other hand, with the vulnerability regions the minimum 
number of anycast nodes is R = 10 with a cost of 266560 
while this cost is reduced to 200217 if R = 11 and to 126362 
if R = 14 (in the latter case, the anycast nodes of the optimal 
solution are shown in Fig. 9b). So, by considering the 
vulnerability regions, the operator can obtain the same 
robustness against natural disasters with: (i) a cost reduction 
of 10.2% (from 223008 to 200217) and at the same time a 
reduction on the number of anycast nodes from 14 to 11 or 
(ii) a cost reduction of 43.3% (from 223008 to 126362) with 
the same number of 14 anycast nodes. 
The optimal anycast nodes presented in Fig. 9 highlight a 
very interesting observation. To fulfil the geodiversity 
requirements, anycast nodes are mainly located on the 
network parts containing closer nodes and shorter links in the 
whole network (Fig. 9a) or only inside the vulnerability 
regions (Fig. 9b). When the vulnerability regions are 
considered, since outside these regions there are no 
geodiversity requirements, anycast nodes are placed more 
uniformly throughout the network obtaining in this way the 
huge cost reduction of 43.3% as already observed. 
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Fig. 8. Optimal costs of CORONET CONUS without (a) and with (b) 
vulnerability regions. In (c), the costs with (labelled with *) and without 
vulnerability regions for D = 120 and 300 Km. 
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Fig. 9. Anycast nodes (in red) of CORONET CONUS for D = 120 Km 
and R = 14 anycast nodes without (a) and with (b) vulnerability regions. 
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(b) 
Fig. 10. CPLEX runtime of CORONET CONUS without (a) and with (b) 
survivability regions. 
Fig. 10 presents the CPLEX runtime values (in seconds) 
of all CORONET CONUS instances without (Fig. 10a) and 
with vulnerability regions (Fig. 10b). All instances were now 
successfully solved by the 32-bit CPLEX version. These 
instances are easier to solve than the Germany50 ones since 
the worst runtime value is below 22 (and 19) seconds among 
all problem instances without (and with) vulnerability 
regions. Note that the ILP models of CORONET CONUS 
instances are much larger (more variables and constraints) 
than the ones of Germany50 instances (usually, larger ILP 
models are harder to solve). In this case, the average node 
degree of CORONET CONUS is much lower than the one of 
Germany50, which implies that the number of possible paths 
between pairs of nodes is smaller which, in turn, makes the 
problems easier to solve. As a final observation, unlike 
Germany50 where the highest runtime values were for the 
larger values of D, for CORONET CONUS the highest 
runtime values are for the smallest values of ܦ. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 In this work, we have exploited path geodiversity in 
anycast communications as a means to enhance the network 
robustness against natural disasters. We have defined and 
solved the minimum cost D-geodiverse anycast routing 
problem with optimal selection of anycast nodes, based on 
integer linear programming, and extended it to consider the 
existence of vulnerability regions. We have presented 
computational results based on two well-known network 
topologies using real information of their hazard regions. 
We were able to compute the optimal solutions for all 
parameters of interest. The results showed that, in general, 
improving the robustness to natural disasters increases the 
routing costs and requires a higher minimum number of 
anycast nodes. More importantly, a careful characterization 
of the vulnerability regions allows the operator to achieve 
either improved robustness with the same cost and number of 
anycast nodes or reduced number of anycast nodes and 
routing costs for the same robustness. Finally, anycast nodes 
in optimal solutions are mainly located on the network parts 
containing closer nodes and shorter links in the whole 
network, if no vulnerability regions are considered, or only 
inside vulnerability regions, otherwise. 
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